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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

WELBY AAGARD,
Plaint~!!

and A.p,pellant,
-vs.DAYTON & MILLER RED-E-MIX
CONCRETE COMPANY, and
THOMAS CHARLES COOK,
Defendants a;nd Respondents.

Case No.

9373

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Brief, Plaintiff and Appellant will be
referred to as plaintiff. Defendants will be referred to as
defendants, or by their individual names, as the case may
be. All italics are ours.
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STATEMENT OF FACT'S
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered on the
24th of October, 1960, of No Cause of Action.
This action arises out of a collision between two
trucks which occurred on the 3rd day of November, 1958,
at approximately 1 :30 P.M. on U.S. Highway 30, six miles
east of Morgan, Utah.
Plaintiff's truck at the time of the collision was
driven by his employee, J. Clifford Bloomquist, Dayton
& Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company truck was being
driven by the other defendant, Thomas Charles Cook.
The collision occurred near the underpass where
U.S. Highway 30 crosses under the Union Pacific Railroad. The point of impact on the truck of plaintiff was
along the left side. The point of impact on the truck of
defendant, Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company, was on the left side of the concrete truck. Plaintiff's truck was extensively damaged and a number of
sheep which it was carrying destroyed.
The case was tried before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist on the 28th of September, 1960, and after trial
the Court made the following Finding of Fact:
"That the evidence is evenly balanced as to
which of the parties was negligent."
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From this Finding of Fact, the Court concluded
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.
The facts, plaintiff maintains, could only have been
found as he contends. There is no credible evidence to
the contrary of his contention. His position is that the
Court arbitrarily and capriciously has refused to give
effect to the undisputed, uncontroverted evidence.
I

Three witnesses testified concerning the scene of the
collision and the circumstances surrounding the way that
plaintiff's truck and the truck belonging to Dayton &
Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete Company came together.
The driver of the plaintiff's truck was a man 66 years
old. He had been hauling lambs up and down the road
on which the collision occurred for several days prior
to the collision. (R. 3). His truck was in good shape, the
brakes and body free of mechanical difficulties of any
kind. (R. 4) He came down the road going west as he entered the underpass and was travelling between 15 and
20 miles per hour. (R. 5). The truck was loaded with 100
head of lambs. As he came out from under the underpass
he saw the truck being driven by Cook. His description
on direct examination was as follows: (R. 6)

"Q. Now, as you approached the underpass, tell
us what happened.
A. Well, when I approached the underpass why
I just got through the underpass about two
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lengths, not hardly two lengths of the truck
I seen - this here cement truck coming and
he was coming at a good rate of speed, and
he was right over there on that curve over
there.

Q. What do you mean when you say 'over there'~
A. About where you can see. I could see he was
on the wrong side of the road when he came
there he pulled back. He was coming back
all right. He was getting back over there all
right when he sideswiped me."
Plaintiff's truck was knocked over into the barrow
pit and came into contact with the side of the road after
the collision. (R. 7 and 8).
On cross-examination 1fr. Bloomquist stated concerning what he observed, as follows: (R. 28)

"Q. Now, you testified I think on direct examination that you were traveling on your own
side of the road~
A.

Yes, sir............ .

Q. And as I recall you said this cement truck
came around the curve and he was on your
side of the road coming right toward youT
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And how far was he on your side of the

road~
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A.

Well, I can't tell you just exactly how far he
was.

Q. I realize sir, you didn't measure it.
A.

No, sir.

Q. And we don't expect to hold you to that type
of an estimate, can you give us in your best
estimate how far you claim this truck was
over on your side of the road.
A.

Well, when I first seen him I figured that
his right front wheel was coming up, was
right on the yellow line.

Q. His right front

wheels~

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then what you're saying, sir, is that all of
his truck was on your side of the road.
A. All, his truck, the way I got it figured out,
and the way it looked to me that his right
front wheel was right on the yellow line between the two yellow lines.

Q. He was coming toward you 1
A.

Yes, sir; on a curve. You see that curve there
you can see the way he came.

Q. Now you are referring to, your point of
reference I take it then is the painted line
on the road that you told us was there at
the time1
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A. Yes, sir. I am positive it was, I wouldn't
swear to it, but I think it was. I know it is
there now. It is dim.

Q. Mr. Bloomquist, do you remember at the time
I took your deposition we discussed how far
this truck was over the line or what you first
saw as to where this truck was and do you
remember telling me that you thought he was
over about 3 or 4 feet and you determined
that by the yellow line~
A.

Yes, well that would put him over 3 or 4 feet
if he was on the yellow line.

Q. Do you remember making this statement to
me in answer to my question, was there any
line or mark on the pavement 1
A. Yes, Sir.

Q.

Could you see it 1

A_.

Well, I could see it when I got around the
bend, I didn't see it when he hit me, of course
I could see ,just, just see him coming and I
could see that he wasn't going to miss me,
I could see that.''

The driver of the truck of defendants was Thomas
Charles Cook. He was a boy of 18 years at the time the
impact occurred, licensed to drive, but without a chauffer's license. He had limited experience in the handling
of the concrete tn1ck. Concerning what Cook observed,
he testified on direct examination as follows: (R.108)
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"Q.
A.

Did he appear to be on his side of the

Road~

He was when he was coming around the corner, he was on his side.

Q. All right, go ahead.
A.

As he passed me it looked like he was very
close and it sounded like somebody running
down the picket fence with a stick.

Q. Did you feel
A. No."

anything~

On cross examination Cook stated as follows, concerning the position of plaintiff. (R. 116)

"Q. You never did then, Mr. Cook, see Mr. Bloomquist's truck other than on its own side of the
road¥
A.

I don't think so. No, I never."

Officer Mason Hill testified concerning the condition
of the road. He discovered that there was no evidence
on the surface of the highway to show the point of impact but he did discover that about 60 steps to the west
of the underpass there was evidence of the plaintiff's
truck leaving the black top. At approximately 70 steps
from the underpass there was evidence of the plaintiff's
truck having come into i1npact with the enbankment on
the north side of the highway. (R. 55).
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A dispute developed between Bloomquist and Cook
concerning the exact place in relationship to the underpass that the impact occurred. The evidence quoted
seems clearly to show that there was no evidence that
Bloomquist ever permitted his truck to be on the half
of the road reserved for eastbound traffic.
Plaintiff's truck was brought to a stop about 70
feet beyond the west side of the underpass. After Bloomquist discovered that the sheep on the truck were dying
and smothering, he moved the truck 2/lOths of a mile
further down the road where he stopped and permitted
the sheep to leave the truck. He thus attempted to prevent any more of them from dying than had already been
killed.
Cook testified that after he came into impact with
the plaintiff's truck, he drove up the highway a short
distance, walked back to the underpass and then rode
on a pickup truck back up to his own truck and proceeded
on up the canyon. He testified that when he came back
down the canyon after unloading his cement he saw the
truck of plaintiff at the side of the road but did not stop.
He never made any report of the collision between the
two vehicles.
Plaintiff's driver, Blomnquist, reported the collision
to the State Highway Patrolman and an investigation
revealed that the truck driven by Cook was the one which
came into ilnpact with plaintiff's truck.
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It is plaintiff's position that the evidence shows
conclusively, without dispute, that the impact occurred
on the half of the highway reserved for westbound traffic
and that the impact could not have occurred without the
negligence of the defendant, Thomas Cook, being the
causative factor.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED
THE UNCONTRADICTED, CREDIBLE AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.

POINT II
DEFENDANT, THOMAS CHARLES COOK, ADMITTED
THAT THE TRUCK OF PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER ON HIS
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.
ARGU~iENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ARBITRARILY DISREGARDED
THE UNCONTRADICTED, CREDIBLE AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.

The witness, Bloomquist, testified clearly, unequivocally and consistently concerning one basic fact which
it is submitted is conclusive. This was the fact that the
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Dayton & Miller Red-E-l\1ix truck was over the center
line of the highway. That the driver of the Dayton truck
was getting back across the line of the highway at the
moment the impact between the sides of the two trucks
occurred. There is no other logical, reasonable, or sensible explanation of how the two vehicles came into impact.
Defendant Cook had no explanation of the impact.
He testified clearly and consistently that at no time had
he ever seen the truck of plaintiff on his side of the highway. He further testified that he did not believe that
there ever was going to be any impact between his truck
and the truck of plaintiff. He likewise testified that he
remained on his own side of the highway. It is obvious
that the testimony of defendant, Cook, could not he accurate since if the truck of plaintiff remained on his side
of the highway, and the truck of the defendants remained
on their side of the highway, there would have been
no collision. When asked on cross examination to explain
this inconsistency, the defendant Cook was unable to
offer any explanation.
There was a basic dispute developed between Cook
and the testimony of Bloomquist as corroborated by
Hill, the Highway Patrolman, concerning the point of
impact. Cook testified that the impact occurred on the
east side of the underpass. Bloomquist testified that it
occurred on the West of the underpass. Hill discovered
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the tracks of plaintiff's truck
underpass leaving the highway
impact between the right side
the hill side which was west of

on the west side of the
and also the evidence of
of plaintiff's truck and
the underpass.

This inconsistency and disagreement between the
testimony of Bloomquist and Cook is not material to any
issue on the question of negligence. As far as plaintiff
is able to discover, it would make no difference whether
the impact occurred on the east side of the underpass or
the west side of the underpass. The crucial question is
whether or not the truck of plaintiff was on its own side
of the highway or infringed upon the portion reserved
for eastbound travel.
It is respectfully submitted that there is no disagreement between the witnesses concerning where the vehicle
of plaintiff was at all times. It was on its own side of
the highway. The dispute arises as to where the defendant's vehicle was. As to this fact the evidence is contradictory.
Having established without dispute the position of
the plaintiff's vehicle, it is respectfully submitted that
the only way that collision could occur was if the defendant's vehicle invaded the half of the highway reserved
for westbound traffic.
It appears to plaintiff that there could be no question that under the circumstances shown by the photoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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graphs and the plat of the highway where there are two
large heavy trucks approaching an underpass, where
visibility through the underpass is obstructed and the
clearance is impaired, that anyone who drove, or permitted his vehicle to invade the half of its highway reserved for traffic moving in the opposite direction would
be negligent in the absence of some emergency or other
satisfactory explanation, as matter of law.
Bloomquist had no interest in the outcome of the
trial and was not in any way monetarily concerned in
who should prevail. True, he was an employe, at the time
of the collision, for the purpose of driving truck of the
plaintiff, but as far as the record indicates was not so
employed at the time of the trial, and as a consequence,
it is submitted, that his interest was not such as would
classify him as a partisan or interested witness.
A very impressive case, concerning the testimony
of an employe in litigation concerning his employer, is
Esso Standard Oil Company v. Stewart, 190 Va. 949, 59
SE 2d 67, 18 ALR 2d. 1319. In this case, employees of defendant testified concerning the adjustments and repairs
made on an oil furnace. The critical question concerned
the condition of the oil furnace at the time of their
inspection and repair. There was no contradictory evidence to the testimony of the employees. The Jury rendered judg1nent in favor of the plaintiff for damage
resulting to his house when the oil furnace created smoke
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
which invaded the premises. The Virginia Court held as
follows:
•'Neither the Jury nor we are entitled to disregard the uncontradicted and not inherently incredible testimony.
"In Epperson v. De Jarnette, 164 Va. 482,
180 S.E. 412, we find :
" 'While the Jury is the Judge of the weight
of testimony, and the credibility of witnesses, it
cannot arbitrarily disregard the uncontradicted
evidence of unimpeached witnesses which is not
inherently incredible and not inconsistent with
other facts and circumstances appearing in the
record, even though such witnesses are interested
in the result of the litigation.' "
This Court, in an original proceedings, arising out
of an Industrial Commission case has cited the rule
in different language but substantially the same as the
Virginia Court. In Jones, et al. v. California Packing
Corporation et al., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640. This
Court, after review of evidence, stated the general rule
as follows:
(P. 619). "No issue is taken with the thought
that the Commission is not obliged to believe evidence if there is anything inherently incredible
about it, or any circumstance to warrant failure
to accept it. However, where facts are proved by
uncontradicted testimony of competent disinterested witnesses and there is nothing inherently
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unreasonable, nor any circumstance which would
tend to raise doubt of its truth, it should be taken
as established. Refusal to do so is an arbitrary
disregard by the trier of the facts, 20 Am. Jr.
1030, Evidence, Sec. 1180; 32 C.J .S., Evidence,
Section 1038, page 1089, Evidence, Sec. 1038. For
a somewhat comprehensive survey of the problem
of when the trier of the fact may disregard uncontradicted testimony, see annotation 8 A.L.R.
796; see also Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 522,
88 P.2d 459, and Gagos v. Industrial Comm., 87
Utah 101, 48 P. 2d 449."
At a later point in the opinion, the Court made the
following additional statement concerning the disregard
of substantial uncontradicted evidence:
"There is substantial, competent evidence
which points so unerringly to the conclusion that
the injury did result from the employment that we
are persuaded that the Commission acted unreasonably and arbitrarily in refusing to believe
it. There is no evidence of any substance to the
contrary."
It is respectfully submitted that a finding which dis~
regards uncontradicted, credible and reasonable testimony is arbitrary. That a finder of facts is as capricious
when he makes no finding in disregard of such evidence
as where he finds facts to the contrary.
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court in
failing to find that the defendants were negligent, arbiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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trarily and capriciously disregarded competent uncontradicted, credible evidence. This Court should reverse the
Trial Court and grant plaintiff a new trial, or order
Judgment entered in his favor.
POINT II
DEFENDANT, THOMAS CHARLES COOK, ADMITTED
THAT THE TRUCK OF PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER ON HIS
SIDE OF THE HIGHWAY.

A slightly different rule applies to the testimony
of a party to an action from the rule applicable where
testimony is given by a disinterested or uninvolved witness.
This Court has on several occasions announced the
rule that a party is bound by the testimony which he
gives. This is so even thought it is of such a nature as
to completely destroy the possibility of his recovery. The
first announcement of this rule by the Utah Supreme
Court was in the case of Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal
Company, 16 Utah 348, 52 Pac. 594. There, the plaintiff
sued for damages resulting from personal injury and
testified in his own behalf concerning certain facts relating to a dangerous overhanging coal slab in the mine
in which he was working. This Court stated the rule as
follows: (Pac. pg. 596)
"If there is a contradiction, it arises from
plaintiff's own testimony. In such case, where
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non-suit is asked, the trial court may consider
such testimony true as bears most strongly
against the interest of the plaintiff."
This Court applied the general rule again in the
case of Benson v. Denver & Rio Gr.avnde W e.stern Railroad Company, 4 U. 2d 38, 286 P. 2d 790. This case involved the testimony of a driver concerning the distance
he could see ahead and the speed at which he was driving.
The Court upholding the granting of a nonsuit, cited
the early case of Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, supra, and quoted with approval the case of
Wheeler v. Fidel~ty & Deposit Company of Maryland,
63 F. 2d 562, as follows: (p. 564) :
"Where, as in this case, the party testifies
in his own behalf, he is not entitled to go to the
Jury on an issue unless that portion of his own
testimony which is least favorable to his contention is of such a character as will sustain a verdict
in his favor."
The Court in the Benson case also cited with approval Alv.attado v. Tucker, 2 U. 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. This
case involved the testimony of a police officer who was
produced and testified on behalf of the plaintiff. This
Court held that where the officer has testified that the
brake marks indicated the automobile to be going between
25 and 30 mHes per hour, a finding would be justified that
the speed was 25 miles per hour. The evidence least
favorable to the party producing it would be accepted.
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This interpretation revealed that the defendant was not
speeding since the speed limit was 25 miles per hour.
There are a number of annotations concerning this
rule. One of the early annotations is at 80 ALR 625.
There, the general rule is recited as follows: (P. 625)
"A majority of the cases support the rule that
a party is precluded by his own testimony which
is favorable to the adverse party."
The annotation cites cases from a number of jurisdictions supporting the general rule. Among those are
the following: United States, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin.
The Utah case cited is Fowler v. Pleasant Valley
Coal Company, supra. A more recent Annotation of the
Rule is at 169 ALR 798. There, the Annotators recite
the rule in the following language: (P. 799)
"If a party, in his testimony, makes a material statement of fact, negavating his right of
action or defense, and no more favorable testin1ony appears to contradict or modify, he is hound
by it regardless of its credibility. Ordinarily, a
Judge or Jury n1ay disbelieve what a party says
on the witness stand, even though uncontradicted,
but under this general rule his opponent is entitled
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to hold him to it, and even to demand a finding
acco·rdingly as matter of law.''
Again numerous jurisdictions are cited as being in
favor of the general rule.
It is respectfully submitted that the testimony of
Cook, who is a party to the action, to the effect that at no
time was the truck of plaintiff observed on the wrong
side of the road, should preclude any speculation or
finding, that it was on the wrong side of the road.
The evidence of the plaintiff consistently also shows
that his truck did remain on its own side of the road.
The only possible way in which the truck of plaintiff
and the truck of defendant, could collide is if the truck
of defendants invaded the side of the highway reserved
for use by westbound traffic.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and contrary to law in ruling
that the evidence was evenly balanced, and plaintiff was
not entitled to recover.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should
reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and order that
the Court detern1ine that the defendants were negligent;
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that plaintiff was entitled to judgment and order a new
trial on the issue of damages only, or in the alternative
grant plaintiff a new trial.
DATED this ________________ day of--------------------------------, 1961.

Respectfully submitted,
KING AND HUGHES
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
No. 205 Sentinel Building
Salt Lake·City, Utah
Attorneys fO'r Plaintiff and
Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

